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COLLOQUIUM 
THE NATURAL LAW ORIGINS OF THE 
AMERICAN RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
NATURAL LAW, SLAVERY, AND THE RIGHT TO 
PRIVACY TORT 
Anita L. Allen* 
 
In 1905 the Supreme Court of Georgia became the first state high court 
to recognize a freestanding “right to privacy” tort in the common law.  The 
landmark case was Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co.  Must it be 
a cause for deep jurisprudential concern that the common law right to 
privacy in wide currency today originated in Pavesich’s explicit judicial 
interpretation of the requirements of natural law?  Must it be an additional 
worry that the court which originated the common law privacy right 
asserted that a free white man whose photograph is published without his 
consent in a city newspaper is like a slave in bondage? 
I argue that the jurisprudence of Pavesich need not be troubling.  
Pavesich’s natural law argument was supplemented by several positive law 
arguments.  The positive law arguments were a strong enough basis for 
finding a right to privacy in the common law, as indeed Samuel Warren and 
Louis Brandeis had previously argued.  The observation that the Pavesich 
court’s natural law argument ran alongside positivistic arguments suggests 
that the arresting, high-toned natural law and slavery appeals in Pavesich 
are inessential rhetorical throwaways.  But I maintain that the natural law 
argument and slavery analogy features of Judge Andrew Jackson Cobb’s 
opinion extolling the “liberty of privacy” are (1) of critical importance to a 
full contextual understanding of the decision and (2) illuminate the 
contemporary case for recognizing invasions of privacy as civil injuries to 
freedom and self-determination.  One can poke holes in the logic of Thomas 
Aquinas and John Locke as scholars have done for centuries.  But one can 
as easily choose to celebrate the spirit of the natural law tradition.  The 
natural law tradition represents efforts rhetorically, rationally, and 
 
*  Henry R. Silverman Professor of Law and Professor of Philosophy, University of 
Pennsylvania.  This Essay was the basis of my March 28, 2012, Natural Law Symposium 
lecture at Fordham Law School and my Bell Distinguished Lectureship in Law lecture in 
honor of the late Judge Samuel H. Bell at Wooster College in April 2012. 
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intuitively to derive principles of justice and goodness from basic facts 
about human characteristics, needs, and desires, where otherwise binding 
sovereign law may fall short. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1905, the Supreme Court of Georgia became the first state high court 
to recognize a freestanding “right to privacy” tort in the common law.1  The 
famous case was Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co.2  Judge 
Andrew Jackson Cobb3 penned a remarkable opinion on behalf of a 
unanimous bench.  The opinion upholding the petitioner’s novel privacy 
claim began with a unique invocation to the demands of natural law4 and 
ended with an arresting analogy between privacy invasions and 
enslavement.5  The victorious petitioner alleging privacy invasion in the 
landmark case was an Atlanta artist, Paolo Pavesich.6 
 
 1. Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905). 
 2. Commentators frequently contrast Pavesich with Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box 
Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).  The New York Court of Appeals in Roberson declined, on 
similar facts, to recognize a right of privacy in the absence of statute. Id. at 447.  This 
position was also apparently taken by a Virginia court in 1906. See Barker v. Richmond 
Newspapers Inc., 14 Va. Cir. 421 (1973) (citing Cyrus v. Bos. Chem. Co., 11 VA. L. REG. 
938 (1906)).  For a contrary Virginia perspective, see The Right to Privacy, 12 VA. L. REG. 
91, 93 (1906) (asserting, following Pavesich, that a right to privacy derives “from natural 
law” and is compelled by rights of “personal security and personal liberty”). 
 3. Judge Cobb served as an Associate Justice on the Georgia Supreme Court from 1897 
to 1907. See SUPREME CT. GA., http://www.gasupreme.us/history/#history (last visited Nov. 
16, 2012). 
 4. Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 70 (“A right of privacy in matters purely private is therefore 
derived from natural law.”). 
 5. Id. at 80 (“[A]s long as the advertiser uses him for these purposes, he cannot be 
otherwise than conscious of the fact that he is for the time being under the control of another, 
that he is no longer free, and that he is in reality a slave, without hope of freedom, held to 
service by a merciless master; and if a man of true instincts, or even of ordinary sensibilities, 
no one can be more conscious of his enthrallment than he is.”). 
 6. The description of the facts in this paragraph conforms to the facts as recited in the 
official syllabus and presupposed by the opinion. See id. at 68–69, 80. 
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As recited in the court opinion, Pavesich had his photograph taken by 
photographer J. Quinton Adams.7  Without Pavesich’s knowledge or 
consent, Adams conveyed a negative of Pavesich’s photograph to Thomas 
B. Lumpkin, an Atlanta-based general agent for New England Life 
Insurance Co.8  Despite lacking authorization from Pavesich, Lumpkin 
incorporated a photograph produced from the Adams negative into an 
advertisement for his employer’s life insurance company, and subsequently 
published the advertisement in the Atlanta Constitution newspaper.9 
Pavesich sued Adams, Lumpkin, and the insurance company in an action 
for libel and invasion of privacy.10  The libel claim was straightforward.  
The advertisement falsely stated that Pavesich had purchased insurance 
from the New England Life Insurance Co.11  The privacy invasion claim 
was not so straightforward.  To begin with, American common law did not 
yet clearly include an express “right to privacy”12 and such a right applied 
to a newspaper publication was necessarily limited by constitutional 
privileges of speech and press.  Pavesich’s case was dismissed by an 
Atlanta trial court but was revived as a result of his successful appeal to the 
Georgia Supreme Court, which cited the putative precepts of natural law 
and aversion to slavery as grounds for its decision.13 
Contemporary critics rarely think to discredit the common law right to 
privacy because of its natural law origins.14  Typical legal critics put it 
down because they deem it (1) inconsistent in principle with free speech 
and press;15 (2) duplicative of other torts such as trespass, defamation or 
 
 7. Id. at 68–69. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id.  The successor to the Atlanta Constitution is today’s Atlanta Journal 
Constitution. 
 10. Id. at 68–69. 
 11. Id. 
 12. See Schuyler v. Curtis, 15 N.Y.S. 787 (Sup. Ct. 1891), rev’d, 42 N.E. 22 (N.Y. 1895) 
(noting that the right to privacy is a basis of liability for nonconsensual public display of a 
bust of a private citizen, but that such a right does not survive death). But see Roberson v. 
Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902) (no privacy right exists in the absence 
of a statute). 
 13. Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 70 (“A right of privacy . . . is therefore derived from natural 
law.”); id. at 80 (“[A]nd, as long as the advertiser uses him for these purposes, he cannot be 
otherwise than conscious of the fact that he is for the time being under the control of another, 
that he is no longer free, and that he is in reality a slave, without hope of freedom, held to 
service by a merciless master.”). 
 14. But see Amy Peikoff, No Corn on This Cobb:  Why Reductionists Should Be All Ears 
for Pavesich, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 751, 788 (2004) (crediting Judge Cobb for seeking to ground  
the right to privacy in “moral and political first principles” but rejecting his natural law 
reasoning as unsound); id. at 787 (“If a study is conducted showing that racism has its 
foundations in ‘instincts of nature’ that cause us to feel uncomfortable around people of 
different races, or to see those of other races as inferior, an enlightened person does not 
conclude that slavery and concentration camps are on that basis given one iota of 
justification.”). 
 15. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy:  The 
Troubling Implications of a Right To Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. 
REV. 1049, 1122–24 (2000). 
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infliction of emotional distress;16 or (3) impractical, unwanted, and old 
fashioned in the age of computer, internet, and electronic technology.17  In 
1998, a few journalistic commentators18 disparaged the common law right 
to privacy because of its natural law rationale after the Georgia Supreme 
Court in Powell v. Georgia19 embarrassed the U.S. Supreme Court by 
striking down the state sodomy statute that the Court had upheld in 1986 in 
the now overruled Bowers v. Hardwick.20  Yet, interestingly, Pavesich has 
never inspired the high profile scholarly and juristic anti-natural law ire that 
Griswold v. Connecticut21 draws. The Supreme Court first recognized a free 
standing “right to privacy” in Griswold.  Some opponents of Griswold’s 
distinctly formulated, penumbral22 constitutional right to privacy reject the 
right23 on the ground that it was based not on a legitimate interpretation of 
 
 16. Diane Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight:  A Farewell to Warren and 
Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 293 (1983). 
 17. Cf. Patricia Abril, Recasting Privacy Torts in a Spaceless World, 21 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 1, 11–12 (2008) (“[F]urther clouding the incoherent development [of the privacy torts] 
is the fact that privacy expectations and norms are constantly challenged by technology. . . . 
[The] conventional view of privacy is inapplicable and misplaced in cyberspace, where there 
are no physical spaces or clear boundaries delineating behavior and propriety.”). 
 18. See, e.g., Jim Wooten, Editorial, Judicial Fiat a Stick in the Mud Justice Warns the 
Majority, ATLANTA J., Nov. 25, 1998, at A14 (“Two weeks after the general election, a 
politically tuned Georgia Supreme Court handed down a ruling that aligns the state’s 
judiciary with its activist brethren and sistren on benches around the nation.  Straining to 
invent a constitutional right to privacy that would comport the law to their social views, six 
members of Georgia’s highest court found grounds overlooked by the U.S. Supreme Court to 
declare the state’s sodomy law unconstitutional.”); cf. Bill Rankin, Sodomy Decision Stems 
from 1905 Privacy Ruling, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Nov. 27, 1998, at E01 (reporting that the 
Georgia high court struck down the state sodomy law upheld in Bowers v. Hardwick, citing 
Pavesich and quoting an expert doubting that Cobb contemplated this application of his 
analysis). 
 19. Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 26 (Ga. 1998) (striking down Georgia a statute 
criminalizing sodomy as applied to consensual adults). 
 20. 478 U.S. 186, 189 (1986) (upholding a Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy as 
applied to consensual adults). 
 21. 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (striking down laws criminalizing the sale, provision, 
and use of contraceptives). 
 22. Id. at 484 (“The foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights 
have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and 
substance.  Various guarantees create zones of privacy.” (citation omitted)); cf. H.L.A. Hart, 
Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 607–08 (1958) 
(introducing the concept of the penumbra of the law) (“We may call the problems which 
arise outside the hard core of standard instances or settled meaning ‘problems of the 
penumbra’; they are always with us whether in relation to such trivial things as the 
regulation of the use of the public park or in relation to the multidimensional generalities of a 
constitution.”). 
 23. Cf. Charles A. Kelbley, The Impenetrable Constitution and Status Quo Morality, 70 
FORDHAM L. REV. 257, 257–58 (2001) (“Unlike [Robert] George, who repeatedly criticizes 
Justice Douglas’s use of the phrase ‘penumbras formed by emanations’ in explaining the 
source of the right of privacy, I find much to be said for that very language. . . .  [Justice] 
Black also criticizes the separate opinions of Justices White, Harlan, and Goldberg for 
engaging in what Black thought was a ‘natural law due process’ methodology to justify the 
recognition of the right of privacy.  In light of Justice Black’s positivism, skepticism, and 
opposition to natural law and natural rights tout court, he is hardly an authority to rely upon 
to support George’s thesis that under our Constitution the legislatures, not the courts, have 
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the text of the Constitution but on nothing more than judicial imaginings of 
“natural law.”24  On its face, however, Griswold did not invoke natural 
law;25 instead the majority opinion of Justice William O. Douglas argued 
that a right to privacy is implicit in the Bill of Rights and major court cases 
interpreting it.26  To say that the constitutional right to privacy that began in 
Griswold—and that provided support for cases as socially transformative as 
Loving v. Virginia,27 Roe v. Wade,28 and Lawrence v Texas29—is grounded 
in natural law jurisprudence is argumentative.  It sounds like an attack of 
the left from the right.30  But to say that the common law right to privacy is 
grounded in natural law, is simply to state an empirical fact.31 
 
the primary authority to give effect to natural law and to protect natural rights.”). See 
generally Dorothy J. Glancy, Douglas’s Right of Privacy:  A Response to His Critics, in “HE 
SHALL NOT PASS THIS WAY AGAIN”:  THE LEGACY OF JUSTICE WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS 155, 
162 (Stephen L. Wasby ed., 1990) (suggesting that limiting government interference with 
personal life lay behind Douglas’s right to privacy). 
 24. See generally Richard F. Gaebler, Is There a Natural Law Right to Privacy? 37 AM. 
J. JURIS. 319, 320 (1992) (arguing that a natural rights argument for privacy rights poses 
theoretical and normative problems). 
 25. Hon. Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, The Natural Law in the American Tradition, 79 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1513, 1515 (2011) (“And, by the time Griswold v. Connecticut was 
decided, all nine of the Justices had decried the use of the natural law in judging.  In 
Griswold, of course, the Court held that a ‘right to privacy’ in the Constitution forbade states 
from criminalizing the use of contraceptives by married couples.  In dissent, Justice Black 
accused the majority of ‘Lochnerizing,’ that is, of importing a ‘natural law due process 
philosophy’ into the Constitution.  Justice Black’s dissent insisted that the Court cannot rely 
on ‘any mysterious and uncertain natural law concept as a reason for striking down [the 
Connecticut] law.’  The majority, for its part, decried the use of natural law as well, in an 
effort to distance itself from Lochner.  Accordingly, those who believe in judicial restraint 
are skeptical of natural law because, to them, it conjures up the judicial adventurism of the 
Lochner era and the Warren Court.  So, we find the natural law under attack from both sides.  
To the left, it is an invention of mystics and religious conservatives.  To the right, it is a 
dangerous invitation for judges to impose their own sense of justice on the country.” 
(alteration in original)). 
 26. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485–86 (“The present case, then, concerns a relationship lying 
within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees. . . .  We 
deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights—older than our political parties, 
older than our school system.”). 
 27. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 28. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 29. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 30. Rejections of supposed “natural law” thinking in constitutional law can also amount 
to attacks of the left on the right. See, e.g., Nelson Tebbe, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 
MICH. L. REV. 459, 483–84 (2010) (“A more plausible case of corruption might be found in 
Chief Justice Burger’s resort to ‘Judeao-Christian moral and ethical standards’ in Bowers v. 
Hardwick.  Never before had privacy jurisprudence turned so openly on the content of 
religious injunctions.  In fact, the opposite was true:  core precedents had abetted, in the 
name of privacy, an individual’s choice to resist efforts to inculcate religious or sectarian 
norms.  Although drawing from natural law was once an accepted form of argumentation, 
the canons of particular faith traditions had for generations been treated as domains separate 
from secular law.  In reaching for parochial standards to underpin the state’s police power 
and categorically reject Hardwick’s privacy claim, Burger introduced a new element into the 
ongoing dispute over the nature and scope of individual autonomy.  The potential 
ramifications for constitutional liberty alone rendered the move noteworthy.”). 
 31. That is, it is to state an empirical fact about express language and, by extrapolation, 
ideology or belief. 
 
1192 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
Has the time come to hold the common law right to privacy to account?  
Although natural law discourse continued to appear in common law cases 
after the dawn of legal realism in the late nineteenth century,32 it has clearly 
gone out of style and out of favor.33  Moreover, while invasions of privacy 
can have adverse ramifications for dignity, reputation, and opportunity, 
those ramifications are rarely perceived as on a par with the conditions of 
chattel slavery as practiced in the American South prior to the Civil War.  It 
is one thing to assert that privacy invasions are as offensive as physical 
violence;34 it is something else to assert that they are tantamount to 
enslavement.  The Pavesich case established an important precedent, but the 
reasoning behind it is infused with what many would regard as myth (that 
universal natural laws binding on the courts are known to human reason) 
and hyperbole (that invasions of privacy are wrongs comparable to slavery). 
Directly confronted, contemporary readers could easily be troubled by 
Pavesich’s myth and hyperbole.  Must it be a cause for deep jurisprudential 
concern that the common law right to privacy in wide currency today 
originated in an explicit judicial interpretation of the requirements of natural 
law?  Must it be an additional worry that the court which spearheaded the 
common law privacy right asserted that a free white man whose photograph 
is published without his consent in a city newspaper is like a slave in 
bondage?  I argue that the jurisprudence of Pavesich need not be troubling 
at all. 
Pavesich’s natural law argument was supplemented by several positive 
law arguments.  The positive law arguments were a strong enough basis for 
finding a right to privacy in the common law, as indeed Samuel Warren and 
Louis Brandeis had previously argued.35  The observation that the Pavesich 
court’s natural law argument ran alongside positivistic arguments could be 
the preface to an argument that the high-toned natural law and slavery 
appeals in Pavesich are inessential throwaways.  But I want to suggest that 
the natural law argument and slavery analogy features of the court’s opinion 
are (1) of critical importance to a full contextual understanding of the 
decision and (2) illuminate the contemporary case for recognizing invasions 
of privacy as civil injuries to freedom and self-determination.  One can 
poke holes in the logic of Thomas Aquinas and John Locke as scholars have 
done for centuries.  But one can also celebrate the spirit of the natural law 
tradition.  The natural law tradition represents efforts rhetorically, 
 
 32. See generally Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 
457 (1897) (noting that the search for law is less a search for abstract principle than the set of 
experience-based predictions about what the courts will do). 
 33. See, e.g., Peikoff, supra note 14, at 787 (rejecting natural law reasoning in Pavesich 
and elsewhere in the law). 
 34. Cf. Lyon v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 37 N.E. 113, 115 (N.Y. 1894) (“Mr. Justice Gray, in 
the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Railway Co. v. Botsford, remarked 
that  ‘The inviolability of the person is as much invaded by a compulsory stripping and 
exposure as by a blow.’” (citation omitted)). 
 35. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 
198–215(1890). 
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rationally, and intuitively to derive principles of justice and goodness from 
basic facts about human characteristics, needs, and desires, where otherwise 
binding sovereign law falls short.36 
Amy Peikoff, one of the few philosophers to problematize Pavesich’s 
natural law moorings, argued that Judge Cobb’s effort to derive privacy 
rights from fundamental moral and political principles constitutes a 
neglected, original contribution to jurisprudence.  She also acknowledged 
that Pavesich was “instrumental in the adoption of a legal right of privacy 
in other states” and that the natural law foundations of the privacy right may 
help to explain its initial influence.37  But Peikoff raised an important set of 
challenges to the philosophical underpinnings of Pavesich: 
[S]ince we are no longer in the age of the Founding Fathers, or of the 
ethical intuitionists, what are the proper moral and political first 
principles, and how are they defended?  Second, what is the connection, if 
any, between privacy and these principles?  If there is such a connection, 
how does it compare to the connection between those same basic 
principles and other rights one would have the law recognize—e.g., rights 
to life, liberty, and property?38 
In this article I engage these smart questions by one of Pavesich’s closest 
readers. 
Part I briefly relates factual details underlying the Pavesich case, beyond 
those included in the reported opinion.  Part II describes the implicit 
organization of the opinion, whose outmoded style contemporary readers 
may find hindering.  Part III lays out the court’s natural law argument. Part 
IV identifies both “soft” and “hard” positivist arguments that played central 
roles alongside Judge Cobb’s natural law argument.  Judge Cobb offered 
sufficient positivistic, precedent-based arguments to supplement his natural 
law argument in Pavesich for recognition of a privacy right.  But, I suggest 
reasons for thinking that a purely positivistic case for privacy rights would 
have been intellectually unsatisfying for a man of Judge Cobb’s ideals and 
background.  Part V sets out Cobb’s slavery analogy.  At first glance, the 
analogy appears to be merely decorative; with closer examination, I argue 
that the analogy cannot be well-understood as literary flourish.  Slavery and 
 
 36. Cf. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR, Letter from Birmingham Jail, in WHY WE CAN’T WAIT 
64 (New Am. Library 2000) (1963) (appealing to the natural law tradition to justify 
nonviolent disobedience to racist laws and legal authorities). 
 37. Cf. Peikoff, supra note 14, at 790–91 (“It is the appeal to basic political and moral 
philosophy that makes the Pavesich opinion distinctive.  I also believe that it is this aspect 
that—despite the opinion’s flaws—made it instrumental in the adoption of a legal right of 
privacy in other states.  Note in this connection that the Pavesich opinion was a unanimous 
decision while the precedent-based arguments in Roberson—arguments resembling those 
made by Warren and Brandeis—resulted in a divided panel.  An argument based on 
fundamental philosophy is more compelling than is an argument as to why precedent that 
seems on its face contrary to the desired outcome, really is after all compatible with 
satisfaction of ‘society’s demand’ for a new right.  And this principle as to which type of 
argument is more compelling applies not only to judges on one’s own bench, but also to 
judges in other jurisdictions.”). 
 38. Peikoff, supra note 14, at 791. 
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the recently abolished institution of African-American slavery had a special 
significance to Georgians in general and to Judge Cobb in particular.  Part 
VI and my Conclusion explain why Cobb’s contractarian natural law 
argument and slavery analogy can be viewed as causes for celebration 
rather than worry when understood as aids to making the case that our 
privacy rights are dimensions of our basic social and political liberty.  
Indeed, Cobb’s characterization of the right to privacy as a demand of 
natural law meshes well with extant normative perspectives that many 
forms of informational and physical privacy are, what I call, “foundational 
goods”—just demands of the government and social order, in all liberty-
loving regimes, for realms of freedom and self-determination that may be 
goods in themselves and that are certainly prerequisites of other goods.39  
Personal freedom and self-determination are recognized contemporary 
values potentially furthered by individual privacy rights.  We often want 
and need our privacy, and it is often inhumane and unjust to deny us what 
Cobb labels our “liberty” to experience it. 
I.  AN UNAUTHORIZED PUBLICATION 
As previously noted, the plaintiff and petitioner was an Atlanta artist—
not a famous one—named Paolo Pavesich.40  Little is known about Mr. 
Pavesich, who appears to have been “lost to history,” apart from his privacy 
suit.41  We learn from his lawsuit that defendant portrait photographer J. 
Quinton Adams had taken a formal photograph of the stout, robust-looking 
Pavesich.42  Adams then gave or sold a negative of Pavesich’s photograph 
to defendant Thomas B. Lumpkin, an Atlanta general agent for defendant 
New England Life Insurance Co.43  Without Pavesich’s prior knowledge or 
consent, Lumpkin, or someone who worked with him, had a photograph of 
Pavesich developed from the Adams negative incorporated into an 
advertisement for a life insurance product.44  On November 15, 1903, the 
advertisement was published in the regionally distinguished Atlanta 
Constitution newspaper.45  For competitive newspapers of the day, 
 
 39. See ANITA L. ALLEN, UNPOPULAR PRIVACY:  WHAT MUST WE HIDE xi, 13, 21, 171 
(2011). 
 40. Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 68 (Ga. 1905). 
 41. Jefferson James Davis, An Enforceable Right of Privacy:  Enduring Legacy of the 
Georgia Supreme Court, 3 J. S. LEGAL HIST., 97, 98 (1994). 
 42. Id. at 99 (naming the photographer as a man called “J. Quinton Adams” whose place 
of business was a short walk from the offices of the New England Life insurance Co.).  
Curiously, a photograph posted on a family genealogy website of a “Paul Pavesich” 
described as a fresco painter (1850–1920) looks remarkably like the man in the newspaper 
advertisement at issue in Pavesich.  It is difficult to gauge the accuracy of amateur 
genealogy. See Pavesich, ANCESTRY.COM, http://search.ancestry.com/cgi-bin/sse.dll?gl=43&
MS_AdvCB=1&rank=1&new=1&MSAV=2&msT=1&gss=angs-g&gsfn_x=1&gsln=Pavesi
ch&gsln_x=1&msydy_x=1&msypn_x=XO&msypn__ftp_x=1&gskw_x=1&_83004002_x=1
&cpxt=0&catBucket=rstp&uidh=000&cp=0&so=2 (last visited Nov. 16, 2012). 
 43. Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 68. 
 44. See id. 
 45. Id. 
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advertising was an especially important source of revenue; it was an 
accomplishment for the Atlanta Constitution to win a major advertising 
client like the New England Life Insurance Co.46  There is no way to 
ascertain whether, what today is a hokey-sounding ad, was then considered 
unusual or if it raised eyebrows in the pressroom. 
Having fallen victim to the commercial imperatives of the insurance and 
newspaper businesses, Pavesich sued Adams, Lumpkin, and the New 
England Life Insurance Co. in an action for libel and invasion of privacy.47  
Pavesich’s case was assigned to Judge Harry M. Reid of the City Court of 
Atlanta.48  The defendants sought to have Pavesich’s case thrown out.  
Perhaps because of Pavesich’s novel privacy claim, Judge Reid entered an 
order sustaining the defendants’ general demurrer.49  Undeterred, claiming 
legal error, Pavesich appealed to the state supreme court (there being no 
intermediate court at the time).50  He prevailed in the appeal.51  Records of 
what happened when the case was presumably remitted back to the lower 
court for disposition on the merits have been lost.52  But the supreme court 
opinion was so clearly in favor of a victory for Pavesich on both the libel 
and privacy claims that the parties may have settled to avoid the bother of a 
trial.53 
As framed by Judge Cobb, who wrote for a unanimous court, the 
Pavesich case presented the novel question “whether an individual has a 
right of privacy which he can enforce, and which the courts will protect 
against invasion.”54  The Georgia court was well aware that the New York 
high court had recently considered the same question in a similar case of 
unauthorized use of a photograph and denied the privacy claim as lacking a 
basis in precedent or statute.55  In the well-known 1902 case, Roberson v. 
Rochester Folding Box Co., the New York Court of Appeals declined to 
recognize a cause of action for invasion of privacy on behalf of a young 
woman whose photograph was used without her prior knowledge or consent 
on advertisements and packaging for baking flour.56  Judge Parker argued 
that there was no right to privacy founded upon the claim that a man has a 
right to pass through this world without having his picture published, his 
 
 46. Davis, supra note 41, at 101–02. 
 47. Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 68–69. 
 48. See Davis, supra note 41, at 106. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See id. 
 51. See Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 81. 
 52. See Davis, supra note 41, at 118. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 69. 
 55. Id. at 77 (citing Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902)). 
 56. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 448 (N.Y. 1902).  I have 
argued elsewhere that the outrage with the decision at the time was related to the fact that the 
plaintiff was a virtuous young female for whom commercial use of her visage despoiled her 
character and reputation. See Anita L. Allen & Erin Mack, How Privacy Got Its Gender, 10 
N. ILL. U. L. REV. 441 (1990).  But even today, when we no longer expect women to be 
hothouse flowers, one finds the court’s refusal to recognize the privacy right disquieting.  
Can people just exploit our images at will for their own commercial purposes? 
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business enterprises discussed, or his eccentricities commented upon, 
“whether the comment be favorable or otherwise.”57  Unconstrained by the 
limitations of positive law, however, Georgia found a basis for a legally 
enforceable right to privacy not only in the deep recesses of positive law but 
importantly also in the “instincts of nature”58 and the requirements of 
natural law.59 
II.  AN OLD-FASHIONED OPINION 
Judge Cobb’s démodé opinion divides into several distinguishable (but 
unnumbered) sections.  He did not have to lay out the facts of the case 
because they appear in the official case syllabus.60  In the first section he 
immediately elaborates the right to privacy as a right grounded in human 
instincts and natural law.  He finds the right to privacy implicit in the “true 
meaning and intent”61 of incontrovertible liberty and security.  In his next 
section he makes what I would characterize as a “soft positivist” argument.  
He identifies some of the “many side lights in the law”62 from which the 
right of privacy can be inferred, including Roman and English common law 
principles.  Here he asserts that the “liberty of privacy” can be forfeited by 
consent or can be waived expressly or impliedly, and that its violation is 
actionable in court like any other tortious injury.63  Recognizing that 
privacy is not always superior to other goods, he notes that legitimate public 
welfare purposes sometimes require publicity.64  He also recognized that 
privacy may at times be required by legitimate public purposes and imposed 
on the unwilling.65  In a third major section, he acknowledges that freedom 
 
 57. Roberson, 64 N.E. at 443. 
 58. Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 69 (“The right of privacy has its foundation in the instincts of 
nature.”). 
 59. Id. at 70 (“A right of privacy in matters purely private is therefore derived from 
natural law.”). 
 60. Id. at 68. 
 61. Id. at 70. 
 62. Id. at 71. 
 63. Id. at 72 (“The right of privacy, however, like every other right that rests in the 
individual, may be waived by him, or by any one authorized by him, or by any one whom 
the law empowers to act in his behalf, provided the effect of his waiver will not be such as to 
bring before the public those matters of a purely private nature which express law or public 
policy demands shall be kept private. . . .  It may be waived for one purpose, and still 
asserted for another; it may be waived in behalf of one class, and retained as against another 
class; it may be waived as to one individual, and retained as against all other persons.”). 
 64. Id. at 73 (“Publicity in many cases is absolutely essential to the welfare of the 
public.”). 
 65. Id. (“The law stamping the unbreakable seal of privacy upon communications 
between husband and wife, attorney and client, and similar provisions of the law, is a 
recognition not only of the right of privacy, but that, for the public good, some matters of 
private concern are not to be made public, even with the consent of those interested.”).  This 
important point jibes with—and helped to inspire—the thesis of my book, UNPOPULAR 
PRIVACY, which is that there are duties as well as rights of privacy, and a place in liberal 
societies for government coerced privacy. See ALLEN, supra note 39 at 9–13, 23.  I devote a 
chapter to professional and employee confidentiality as an example of privacy duties often 
imposed, without regard to consent. Id. at 99–122. 
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of speech and press must constrain privacy, for to speak and publish truth 
are natural and constitutional liberties.66  In a fourth section Cobb makes, 
what I term, his “hard positivist” case for privacy, relying on roughly one 
dozen cases that lend support to the existence of a right of privacy distinct 
from rights of contract, property trust, or confidence.67  In this section he 
addresses the elephant in his room—New York’s Roberson decision—
rejecting the persuasive precedent established by its holding, and siding 
with dissenting Judge John Clinton Gray, whose opinion he quotes virtually 
in full.68  Against the Parker majority in Roberson, with its deference to the 
power of legislative innovation, Judge Cobb warned of the dangers of 
excessive interpretative “conservatism.”69 
In a fifth section, Cobb explains the nature of the injury that privacy 
invasions constitute and why constitutional concerns about free speech and 
press do not apply to an unauthorized publication of a photo.70  He 
emphasizes that the Georgia Constitution protects speech and publications 
of a person’s sentiments, not others’ images.71  In this section, he makes the 
notable analogy between privacy invasion and slavery.72  The opinion 
finishes off with a workmanlike analysis of Pavesich’s compelling libel 
charge.73 
III.  THE NATURAL LAW ARGUMENT FOR THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
The right to privacy is derived from natural law, since the desire for 
privacy is “recognized intuitively” as demanded by human instinct.74  
According to Judge Cobb: 
Any person whose intellect is in a normal condition recognizes at once 
that . . . there are matters private, and there are matters public so far as the 
individual is concerned.  Each individual . . . instinctively resents any 
encroachment by the public upon his rights which are of a private nature 
 
 66. Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 73 (“The stumbling block which many have encountered in the 
way of a recognition of the existence of a right of privacy has been that the recognition of 
such right would inevitably tend to curtail the liberty of speech and of the press.”). 
 67. Id. at 74–76. 
 68. Id. at 78–79 (extensively quoting Judge Gray). 
 69. Id. at 78 (“With all due respect to Chief Judge Parker and his associates who 
concurred with him, we think the conclusion reached by them was the result of an 
unconscious yielding to the feeling of conservatism which naturally arises in the mind of a 
judge who faces a proposition which is novel.  The valuable influence upon society and upon 
the welfare of the public of the conservatism of the lawyer, whether at the bar or upon the 
bench, can not be overestimated; but this conservatism should not go to the extent of 
refusing to recognize a right which the instincts of nature prove to exist, and which nothing 
in judicial decision, legal history, or writings upon the law can be called to demonstrate its 
nonexistence as a legal right.”). 
 70. Id. at 80–81. 
 71. Id. at 80. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 81. 
 74. Id. at 69. 
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. . . .  A right of privacy in matters purely private is therefore derived from 
natural law.75 
Cobb went on to argue that the rights derived from natural law are 
“immutable,” “absolute,” and belong to every man, whether in the state of 
nature or in society.76  Introducing the language of social contract theory, 
Cobb depicts the right to privacy as a right that a just civil society would be 
expected by its members to protect.   
It was not extraordinary in Judge Cobb’s era to presume rights not 
embraced or incorporated.  In the decades before Pavesich and for a time 
thereafter, Georgia judges commonly referenced “natural law” to support 
their conclusions of law.  They referred to the “natural instincts” of men and 
animals.77  They referred in passing to natural laws, such as the physical 
law that water flows and fruit decays.78  But of greater relevance here, they 
sometimes referred to “natural law” as meaning the fixed norms governing 
human conduct and relationships, such as the “natural law” that the marital 
promise is binding and the “natural law” that property is alienable.79  
Pavesich was not the first and only case in which Judge Cobb himself 
referenced natural law.  He invoked the concept of natural law in other, 
 
 75. Id. at 69–70. 
 76. Id. at 70. 
 77. See, e.g., Rollestone v. T. Cassirer & Co., 59 S.E. 442, 446 (Ga. App. 1907) (holding 
that a dog’s natural instinct attracted him to a trap baited with “stinking meat”); see also 
Lowe v. Brooks, 23 Ga. 325 (1857) (stating that it was the natural instinct of a man that his 
wife and children should enjoy the property—in this instance “two negroes”—he leaves 
behind). 
 78. See, e.g., Forrester v. Ga. R.R. & Banking Co., 19 S.E. 811, 813 (Ga. 1893) (noting 
the natural law of fruit decay); Haywood v. Mayor of Savannah, 12 Ga. 404, 411 (1853) 
(stating it is the “natural law[] that water runs and will run”); see also Patton v. State, 43 S.E. 
533, 534 (Ga. 1903) (“But while it cannot consider the credibility of a witness, it must 
consider the nature and character of his testimony—whether it is in accord with natural laws, 
or is improbable, incredible, or seeks to establish facts which are impossible, or which, if not 
impossible, must, in their very nature, be uncertain, vague, indefinite, and insufficient to 
remove reasonable doubts.”); S. Ry. Co. v. Covenia, 29 S.E. 219, 219 (Ga. 1896) (“The 
question is, therefore, squarely made whether the court, on demurrer, can take judicial 
cognizance of the fact that a child of this tender age is incapable of rendering such service as 
would authorize the parent to recover, or whether, in such a case, the court is bound to 
submit the matter to the jury.”); Rome Ry. & Light Co. v. Keel, 60 S.E. 468, 470 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1908) (“[F]or gravity, though a well-known law, produces a uniform acceleration.  
Under these laws of nature of which the court must take judicial notice, a sudden jump or 
jerk of the car cannot be produced by merely throwing off the brakes.  Something else must 
concur to produce these effects.”); Wright v. Floyd Cnty., 58 S.E. 72, 74 (Ga. Ct. App. 1907) 
(“[T]he use and easement would, by operation of universally known natural laws, inevitably 
and constantly tend to injure and destroy the bridge and to impair its usefulness for public 
travel, and thereby to create a public nuisance.”). 
 79. Askew v. Dupree, 30 Ga. 173, 176 (1860) (marriage is a contract of natural law with 
civil consequences); Gresham v. Webb, 29 Ga. 320, 324 (1859) (“By natural law the 
alienability of property is without restriction; alienability makes a part, and a great part, of 
the value of property.  On those, then, who assert a restriction on the alienability of property, 
is the burden of showing, clearly, that there is some municipal laws which makes the 
restriction.”); cf. Gillis v. Gillis, 23 S.E. 107 (Ga. 1895) (natural law of mental competence). 
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uncelebrated cases.80  In at least one case before him, Judge Cobb found a 
natural law invocation unimpressive.81 
As to the natural right of privacy, however, Cobb was impressed by how 
well it applied to Pavesich’s case.  He was certain that future generations 
would “marvel” that the existence of the right by common law courts could 
ever have been doubted.82  Cobb straightforwardly linked the right to 
privacy to liberty and personal security: 
The right of privacy within certain limits is a right derived from natural 
law, recognized by the principles of municipal law, and guaranteed to 
persons in this state both by the Constitutions of the United States and of 
the state of Georgia, in those provisions which declare that no person shall 
be deprived of liberty except by due process of law.83 
In the United States, we understand the constitutional right to privacy first 
recognized in Griswold as boiling down to the liberty to choose and decide 
a range of intimate matters relating to marriage, child-rearing, reproduction, 
health, intellect, and affiliation.  In its earliest beginnings with the Pavesich 
case, the common law right to privacy, too, was understood and portrayed 
as a matter of liberty:  “liberty of choice as to his manner of life.”84  Cobb 
elaborated: 
Liberty includes the right to live as one will, so long as that will does not 
interfere with the rights of another or of the public.  One may desire to 
live a life of seclusion; another may desire to live a life of publicity; still 
another may wish to live a life of privacy as to certain matters, and of 
publicity as to others.  One may wish to live a life of toil, where his work 
is of a nature that keeps him constantly before the public gaze, while 
another may wish to live a life of research and contemplation, only 
moving before the public at such times and under such circumstances as 
may be necessary to his actual existence.  Each is entitled to a liberty of 
choice as to his manner of life, and neither an individual nor the public 
has a right to arbitrarily take away from him this liberty.85 
Following this line of reasoning, if Paolo Pavesich chose to live in seclusion 
and others forced him into “the public gaze” by causing his photograph to 
 
 80. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Purse, 28 S.E. 896, 898 (Ga. 1897) (holding that a school 
may suspend a child whose mother has disrupted a classroom); id. (“This parental duty [to 
educate children] is strongly and persuasively inculcated by the writers on natural law.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 81. Cobb was not always impressed by claims of natural law. See Prey v. Oemler, 47 
S.E. 546 (Ga. 1904).  Here, Cobb upheld an order denying a new trial where plaintiffs had 
complained that a statute was “too vague and indefinite to be enforced, and also is contrary 
to natural law, and violative of natural rights to fish in the sea, and arms thereof.” Id. at 546.  
Cobb sardonically adjudged that “[t]his assignment of error is too vague and indefinite to 
raise any question for decision.” Id. 
 82. Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 81 (Ga. 1905) (“[W]e venture to 
predict that the day will come that the American bar will marvel that a contrary view was 
ever entertained by judges of eminence and ability . . . .”). 
 83. Id. at 71. 
 84. Id. at 70. 
 85. Id. 
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be published in a mass circulated newspaper in a libelous advertisement—
to use Cobb’s original phrase—his “liberty of privacy” has been impaired.86 
Today, we lawyers would classify Pavesich’s case as an example of the 
invasion of the right to publicity, or as an appropriation of likeness or 
identity and a false light publication.87  We would not call it an intrusion 
upon seclusion, because there was no physical violation, and we would not 
say it was a publication of private fact because of the libel.  Such mid-
century classifications are standard today, and yet our reliance upon them 
cloaks Cobb’s early twentieth century insight.  An unauthorized publication 
of a photograph may hurt, whatever wrongs the lawyers’ and philosophers’ 
taxonomies name it, because it rips us from our own lives.88  It is an act of 
subjugation.  Normatively speaking, individuals possess a “liberty of 
privacy” simply by virtue of being human, a liberty that unwanted 
intrusions, publications, and identity appropriations can offend. 
Cobb’s opinion recognizing a legal interest in “the name and non libelous 
misrepresentation” was apparently received in elite legal circles as 
innovative, but not wild.  For example, it was noted with approval in the 
Harvard Law Review in 1907 as “an important advance.”89  Cobb’s holding 
was promptly put to use to support all manner of claims by litigants and 
commentators, including a law review commentator suggesting that 
Pavesich might apply in a case where a photographer took more 
photographs than authorized of the plaintiff’s conjoined twins and even 
copyrighted some.90  Several states, including Rhode Island, declined 
immediately to embrace the natural law argument for privacy rights and 
chose to wait for a more developed jurisprudence or statute.91  Within a 
 
 86. Id. at 72. 
 87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).  Section 652A states: 
(1) One who invades the right of privacy of another is subject to liability for the 
resulting harm to the interests of the other. 
(2) The right of privacy is invaded by 
(a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another, as stated in § 652B; 
or 
(b) appropriation of the other’s name or likeness, as stated in § 652C; or 
(c) unreasonable publicity given to the other’s private life, as stated in 
§ 652D; or 
(d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the 
public, as stated in § 652E. 
 88. Anita L. Allen, Privacy Torts:  Unreliable Remedies for LGBT Plaintiffs, 98 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1711, 1715 (2010) (arguing that plaintiffs’ experiences of the invasion and the 
lawyers’ taxonomies are dissonant); id. (“[T]he frequent practice of characterizing a single 
privacy invasion as an instance of multiple privacy torts calls into question the integrity of 
Prosser’s framework of formal categories.”). 
 89. Right of Privacy—Infringement—Unauthorized Use of Name and Picture for 
Purposes of Trade, 21 HARV. L. REV. 63, 63 (1907). 
 90. Right of Privacy—Nature and Extent of Right, 26 HARV. L. REV. 275, 275–276 
(1913) (citing Douglas v. Stokes, 149 S.W. 849 (Ky. 1912)). 
 91. See Henry v. Cherry & Webb, 73 A. 97, 104–09 (R.I. 1909) (“It is evident, therefore, 
that the court considered the right of privacy as a natural right, and that natural rights are 
something reserved from all governments when society was formed; in other words, that 
there are rights reserved to the people, other and above those guaranteed by the Constitutions 
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decade, courts were more open to the right.92  By 1960 there would be, 
according to William Prosser’s count, some 300 state law cases recognizing 
a right to privacy protecting interests in seclusion, good reputation, and 
freedom from unwanted publicity and commercial appropriation.93 
IV.  THE POSITIVE LAW ARGUMENT FOR THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
Judge Cobb defended a natural law foundation for the right to privacy, 
while also utilizing Roman law, state case law precedent, and constitutional 
law—multiple sources of positive law offering protection for liberty and 
due process.  Thus, although the right to privacy is “derived from natural 
law,” it is, Cobb argued, recognized by the principles of municipal law and 
the constitutions of the United States and of the state of Georgia in 
provisions declaring that no person shall be deprived of liberty except by 
due process of law.94  Cobb’s opinion took on the task of laying out the 
positive law case to support his positive law claim. 
Cobb also appealed to case law precedent.  He displayed a capacity for 
reading authoritative precedent broadly in his treatment of Wallace v. 
Railway Co.95: 
The right to withdraw from the public gaze at such times as a person may 
see fit, when his presence in public is not demanded by any rule of law, is 
also embraced within the right of personal liberty.  Publicity in one 
instance, and privacy in the other, are each guarantied [sic].  If personal 
liberty embraces the right of publicity, it no less embraces the correlative 
right of privacy, and this is no new idea in Georgia law.  In Wallace v. 
Railway Co., it was said:  “Liberty of speech and of writing is secured by 
 
of the United States and states, and that these rights are enforceable in a court of justice.  It is 
also obvious that, the right being reserved from all government when society was formed, its 
binding force on the Legislature, a branch of the government, is as transcendent as it is on 
the judiciary, a branch of the same government. . . .  The foregoing consideration, together 
with an examination of the authorities, lead us to the same conclusion as that reached by a 
majority of the court in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., ‘that the so-called right of 
privacy has not as yet found an abiding place in our jurisprudence, and, as we view it, the 
doctrine cannot now be incorporated without doing violence to settled principles of law by 
which the profession and the public have long been guided.’” (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted)). 
 92. In 1911, an editor of the Harvard Law Review concluded that the “weight of 
authority in the United States now recognizes the right to privacy without the aid of statute.” 
See Right of Privacy—Nature and Extent of Right, 24 HARV. L. REV. 680, 681 (1911).  Note 
the trend toward embracing Cobb’s natural law based right in Barber v. Time, Inc., 159 
S.W.2d 291, 294 (Mo. 1942) (stating that a right to privacy exists based on natural law and 
was guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution where the plaintiff alleged that the defendant 
magazine violated her privacy by publishing her picture with an article about a physical 
ailment for which she was being treated). 
 93. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 388–89 (1960). 
 94. Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 70–71 (Ga. 1905). 
 95. 22 S.E. 579 (Ga. 1894).  Although Pavesich refers to this case as Wallace v. Railway 
Co., the South Eastern Reporter identifies it as Wallace v. Georgia, C. & N. Ry. Co. 
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the Constitution, and incident thereto is the correlative liberty of silence, 
not less important nor less sacred.”96 
Cobb’s effort to support the right to privacy with positive precedent read 
generously owes a debt to Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis.  Warren and 
Brandeis in their landmark Harvard Law Review article urged the creation 
of an invasion of privacy tort to protect “inviolate personality.”97  At the 
same time, they urged that such a right could be easily extrapolated from 
existing common law.  In The Right to Privacy, Warren and Brandeis 
explored a handful of English and American cases which they felt could be 
better rationalized on principles of privacy than other available legal 
principles.98  They cited the New York case of Marion Manola—Judge 
Cobb cited the case, too—in which a court expressly applied privacy 
concepts on behalf of a theatrical performer whose photograph had been 
taken and would have been published without her consent but for a timely 
injunction.99  Quoting Judge Gray, Cobb cited the idea of a “right of the 
individual to be let alone” popularized by Warren and Brandeis,100 whose 
article Cobb admired,101 but gave a much more diverse set of examples of 
how the right could be impaired—stalking women and children, creating a 
nuisance, trespassing, gossiping, eavesdropping, and arbitrarily searching 
and seizing houses and papers.102  No mere mimic, Cobb linked his 
examples back to the ideas of choice, freedom, and liberty. 
Because he wrote later, Cobb could cite cases that arose after 1890 when 
Warren and Brandeis seeded the field for judicial recognition of the right to 
privacy.  One such significant case is Schuyler v. Curtis.103  There, a family 
complained about the anticipated public display at a fair of a bust honoring 
a deceased female family member, citing the deceased’s right to privacy.  
The lower court in Schuyler extolled the importance of the privacy of 
someone who had lived in decorous seclusion, observing that “[s]he was 
undoubtedly a woman of rare gifts and of a broad and philanthropic nature; 
 
 96. Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 70 (citation omitted). 
 97. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 35. 
 98. See generally id. 
 99. Id. at 195–96 & 195 n.7; see also Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 74; Manola Gets an 
Injunction, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1890, at 3; Miss Manola Seeks an Injunction, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 21, 1890, at 2; Photographed in Tights:  Marion Manola Caught on Stage by a 
Camera, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1890, at 2. 
 100. Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 78. 
 101. Jonathan Kahn, Controlling Identity:  Plessy, Privacy, and Racial Defamation, 54 
DEPAUL L. REV. 755, 756–57 (2005) (“Soon after the decision was announced, Cobb wrote a 
flattering letter to Justice Brandeis, calling his attention to this, the first opinion to recognize 
the right to privacy, and expressing Cobb’s confidence that it would, before long, become 
the norm.”). 
 102. See, e.g., Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 71 (“An outrage was committed not only by striking 
with the fists or with the club or lash, but also by shouting until a crowd gathered around 
one, and it was an outrage or legal wrong to merely follow an honest woman or young boy 
or girl; and it was declared in unequivocal terms that these illustrations were not 
exhaustive.”). 
 103. Schuyler v. Curtis, 15 N.Y.S. 787 (Sup. Ct. 1891), aff’d, 19 N.Y.S. 264 (Gen. Term  
1892), rev’d, 42 N.E. 22 (N.Y. 1895). 
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but these she exercised as a private citizen, in an unobtrusive way.”104  
Without questioning the legitimacy of privacy rights asserted by an 
individual during the individual’s own lifetime, a later state court on appeal 
denied that families can assert privacy on behalf of deceased relatives who 
may or may not have wished others to honor them with a public statute after 
their deaths.105 
Cobb addressed the positive law elephant in the Georgia supreme 
courtroom—Roberson, the decision of a majority of the New York high 
court rejecting the right to privacy as lacking sufficient basis in existing 
law.106  Cobb and his brethren rejected the Roberson majority.  Cobb wrote 
an opinion embracing the logic of the lengthy dissenting opinion of Judge 
Gray, whose opinion he quoted in full.107  Against the majority in 
Roberson, he observed the dangers of excessive interpretative 
“conservatism.”108  Cobb explained the nature of the injury that privacy 
invasions constitute and why constitutional concerns about free speech and 
press do not apply to an unauthorized publication of a photo.109  He 
emphasized that the Georgia Constitution protects speech and publications 
of a person’s sentiments, not others’ images.110 
Cobb wrote of “a liberty of privacy”—the phase is awkward to our 
ears—emphasizing that it belongs to free peoples and can be freely chosen 
or waived by them:  “The liberty of privacy exists, has been recognized by 
the law, and is entitled to continual recognition.”111  To be denied privacy is 
to be denied a critical component of liberty.  We are talking about a tort, 
and invasions of privacy give rise to a private cause of action for tort 
damages suitable for wounded feelings.112  Judge Cobb considered at length 
the constitutional objections to the right of privacy in general and as applied 
to the instant case.  He concluded, however, that the Georgia Constitution 
grants one the right to publish one’s “sentiments” and denied that a 
 
 104. Id. at 788. 
 105. See Schuyler v. Curtis, 42 N.E. 22, 26 (N.Y. 1895) (“The fact that Mrs. Schuyler is 
dead alters the case, and the plaintiff and other relatives must show some right of their own 
violated, and that proof is not made by evidence that the proposed action of the defendants 
would have caused Mrs. Schuyler pain if she were living.  A shy, sensitive, retiring woman 
might naturally be extremely reluctant to have her praises sounded, or even appropriate 
honors accorded her while living; and the same woman might, upon good grounds, believe, 
with entire complacency and satisfaction, that after her death a proposition would be made 
and carried out by her admirers to do honor to her memory by the erection of a statue or 
some other memorial.”). 
 106. See generally Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902). 
 107. See Pavesich 50 S.E. at 72, 78–79. 
 108. Id. at 78. 
 109. See id. at 80. 
 110. See id. 
 111. Id. at 72. 
 112. Id. at 73 (“It is a tort, and it is not necessary that special damages should have 
accrued from its violation in order to entitle the aggrieved party to recover.  In an action for 
an invasion of such right the damages to be recovered are those for which the law authorizes 
a recovery in torts of that character, and, if the law authorizes a recovery of damages for 
wounded feelings in other torts of a similar nature, such damages would be recoverable in an 
action for a violation of this right.” (citation omitted)). 
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photograph accompanied by libelous text qualifies as publishers’ or 
advertisers’ “sentiments.”113  There is a positive right to privacy, and it can 
be violated by unauthorized libelous publication.  And when this sort of 
thing happens, the perpetrator has assumed the role of master over a slave. 
V.  “IN REALITY A SLAVE”—INVASIONS OF PRIVACY AS ENSLAVEMENT 
After making his natural law and positivistic case for the right to privacy, 
Judge Cobb elaborated on the sort of injury that an invasion of the liberty of 
privacy amounts to.  It amounts to the coercive institution recently 
abolished in his homeland, slavery: 
The knowledge that one’s features and form are being used for such a 
purpose, and displayed in such places as such advertisements are often 
liable to be found, brings not only the person of an extremely sensitive 
nature, but even the individual of ordinary sensibility, to a realization that 
his liberty has been taken away from him; and, as long as the advertiser 
uses him for these purposes, he cannot be otherwise than conscious of the 
fact that he is for the time being under the control of another, that he is no 
longer free, and that he is in reality a slave, without hope of freedom, held 
to service by a merciless master . . . .114 
The equation of privacy invasion to slavery is more than casual rhetoric 
here.  Moreover, it is anything but predictable.  In the notorious State v. 
Mann,115 the concept of privacy was used, not on behalf of the slave, but on 
behalf of the master.  The ideal of privacy was employed to help rationalize 
the court’s unwillingness to punish a white man for whipping and shooting 
a slave:  “The power of the master must be absolute, to render the 
submission of the slave perfect.”116  Bloody vengeance is heaped upon 
defiant slaves “with impunity, by reason of its privacy.”117  Cobb’s slavery 
analogy could be understood as hyperbole and literary flourish.  But 
consider the author and his context. This is Georgia, less than a generation 
after the end of lawful enslavement of African Americans, and Judge Cobb 
is from a prominent slave-holding Confederate family.  Cobb’s unique 
slavery analogy impels consideration of the context of law and society in 
which Cobb designed and executed the Pavesich opinion. 
Andrew Jackson Cobb was a long-time Associate Justice on the Georgia 
Supreme Court when he issued the opinion on behalf of a unanimous court 
recognizing a right of privacy grounded in the natural instincts of man.  
Judge Cobb’s seeming boldness in pushing the boundaries of the law did 
not come from being the oldest judge on the panel or its chief—he was 
neither of these.  But he was the closest thing to a scholar on the court, 
which otherwise consisted of white male Democrats who had learned the 
 
 113. Id. at 80. 
 114. Id. 
 115. 13 N.C. 263 (1829). 
 116. Mann, 13 N.C. at 266.  I am indebted to David Fryer for pointing this out to me. 
 117. Id. at 267. 
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law at the feet of practicing attorneys rather than in law school.118  Like his 
famous father Howell Cobb119 and his even more famous uncle Thomas 
Reade Rootes (R.R.) Cobb,120 Judge Cobb displayed an intellectual interest 
in the law and its moral and political limits. 
Born in Athens, Georgia, in 1857, Judge Cobb descended from one of the 
most prominent, politically engaged families of the antebellum and Civil 
War era South.121  His paternal ancestry may have been Welsh.122  Judge 
Cobb’s grandfather, John A. Cobb, had been a successful slave-owning 
planter, an émigré from North Carolina to Georgia. Two of John A. Cobb’s 
three sons, Howell Cobb and Thomas R.R. Cobb, would become heroes of 
the Confederacy. 
Howell Cobb,123 Judge Cobb’s father, was a lawyer who served as a 
member of Congress, Governor of Georgia, and Treasury Secretary under 
President James Buchanan.124  Howell Cobb acted as President of the 
Provisional Confederate Congress and administered the oath of office to 
Jefferson Davis as the first Confederate President.125  During the Civil War, 
Howell Cobb served as a major general in the army.126  He survived the 
war, but died of a heart attack in 1868, when Andrew was still a boy.127  
Judge Cobb’s uncle, Thomas R.R. Cobb, also began as a lawyer.128  
Thomas was principal author of the Constitution of the Confederacy and a 
confederate general who died on the battlefield.129 
Both Thomas and Howell Cobb were passionate, if initially reluctant, 
defenders of Georgia succession.  They were not, however, reluctant or 
 
 118. Davis, supra note 41, at 106 (describing the court as a collection of white male 
Democrats without law degrees, most considerably younger than their chief justice, who was 
in his sixties). 
 119. See Howell Cobb (1815–1868), NEW GA, ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.georgia
encyclopedia.org/nge/Article.jsp?id=h-615&hl=y (last visited Nov. 16, 2012). 
 120. See Thomas R. R. Cobb (1823–1862), NEW GA. ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.georgia
encyclopedia.org/nge/Article.jsp?id=h-2487&hl=y (last visited Nov. 16, 2012). 
 121. See American Bar Association Politician Members in Georgia, 
POLITICALGRAVEYARD.COM, http://politicalgraveyard.com/geo/GA/aba.html (last visited 
Nov. 16, 2012) (“Andrew Jackson Cobb (b. 1857)—also known as Andrew J. Cobb—of 
Athens, Clarke County, Ga. Born in Athens, Clarke County, Ga., April 12, 1857. Son of 
Howell Cobb and Mary Ann (Lamar) Cobb.  Democrat.  Lawyer; law professor; justice of 
Georgia state supreme court, 1897–1907; Presidential Elector for Georgia, 1912.  Baptist.  
Member, American Bar Association; Phi Beta Kappa; Kappa Alpha Order. Burial location 
unknown. . . .  Married, March 3, 1880, to Starkie Campbell (died 1901).”).  
 122. A MEMORIAL VOLUME OF THE HON. HOWELL COBB OF GEORGIA 14 (Samuel Boykin 
ed., 1870). 
 123. See Howell Cobb, supra note 119. 
 124. Jean H. Baker, Learning from Buchanan, N.Y. TIMES:  OPINIONATOR (Feb. 26, 2011, 
6:30 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/02/26/learning-from-buchanan/. 
 125. Cobb served as president of the Provisional Confederate Congress. See Howell 
Cobb, supra note 119.  Cobb administered the oath of office to Davis.  See American 
President:  A Reference Resource, MILLER CTR., http://millercenter.org/president/buchanan/
essays/cabinet/279 (last visited Nov. 16, 2012). 
 126. See Howell Cobb, supra note 119. 
 127. See id. 
 128. See Thomas R. R. Cobb, supra note 120. 
 129. See id. 
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ambivalent defenders of slavery.  To the contrary, they were thought-
leaders in the defense of slavery, extolling the institution as both legal and 
moral.  Thomas R.R. Cobb, who “bought, sold, and hired out slaves to suit 
his needs,”130 authored the influential treatise, An Inquiry into the Law of 
Negro Slavery in the United States of America.131  Howell Cobb, who 
owned as many as a thousand slaves, authored a pro-slavery essay, A 
Scriptural Examination of the Institution of Slavery.132  Judge Andrew 
Cobb was doubtless cared for by slaves as a child.  He was early exposed to 
his family’s beliefs (set out in his father Howell Cobb’s essay) that slavery 
was a just legal institution and that African blacks were an inferior, sinful 
race God placed under the protection of Christian white men for their care 
and betterment. 
Judge Cobb was his father’s and uncle’s intellectual equal.  He was 
arguably their moral superior, in so far as he came to turn his back on many 
forms of legal injustice to ethno-racial minority groups.  A law school-
educated lawyer, Cobb was a moderate social conservative, a Jacksonian 
Democrat (like his father), and a Baptist, who actively supported an 
initiative to ban the sale of alcohol in his native Athens.133  He was 
regarded as a gifted practicing attorney and was a part-time law 
professor.134  Cobb was no mere intellectual or academic.  Cobb took an 
active interest in the nitty-gritty of judicial administration and procedure.  
He was instrumental in supporting a 1906 amendment to the Georgia 
Constitution creating a three judge court of appeals, to relieve the work load 
of the state supreme court.135  It was noted in the Georgia Law Review that, 
as a jurist, Cobb was the most cited judge in the state and that he had 
written more opinions than any other judge systematizing and clarifying 
matters of pleading and practice.136 
 
 130. WILLIAM B. MCCASH, THOMAS R.R. COBB (1823–1862):  THE MAKING OF A 
SOUTHERN NATIONALIST 94 (2004). 
 131. THOMAS R.R. COBB, AN INQUIRY INTO THE LAW OF NEGRO SLAVERY IN THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA (1858). 
 132. HOWELL COBB, A SCRIPTURAL EXAMINATION OF THE INSTITUTION OF SLAVERY:  WITH 
ITS OBJECTS AND PURPOSES 3 (1856) (“African slavery is a punishment, inflicted upon the 
enslaved, for their wickedness. . . .  Slavery, as it exists in the United States, is the 
Providentially-arranged means whereby Africa is to be lifted from her deep degradation, to a 
state of civil and religious liberty.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 133. See E. Merton Coulter, The Athens Dispensary, 50 GA. HIST. Q. 1, 14–36 (1966). 
 134. POLITICALGRAVEYARD.COM, supra note 121. 
 135. History of the Court of Appeals, CT. APPEALS GA., www.gaappeals.us/history/
index.php (last visited Nov. 16, 2012) (citing a discussion at the 1902 Warms Springs 
meeting of the state Bar Association and stating that “[t]he discussion was based on a paper 
delivered by Justice Andrew J. Cobb captioned:  ‘The Judicial System of Georgia:  Its 
Defects; What Changes Are Necessary to Bring About a More Harmonious and Orderly 
System and to Relieve the Supreme Court?’  This paper recites statistics demonstrating that 
it was not humanly possible for the Supreme Court Justices to manage the workload.  Justice 
Cobb noted, ‘The working hours of the Court for hearing argument and consultation have 
been, since October 1897, from 9 a.m. to 1 p.m. and from 3 p.m. to 5 p.m. in the Fall and 
Winter and 6 p.m. in the Spring and Summer.  These hours, however, do not represent all of 
the working hours of the justices.’” (citations omitted)). 
 136. A.W. Cozart, Andrew J. Cobb, The Supreme Court Judge, 1 GA. L. REV. 38 (1927). 
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After Cobb left the bench he returned to law practice, carrying with him a 
keen interest in matters of legal justice.  He joined the many secular and 
clerical individuals who supported clemency for Leo Frank.  Frank was the 
tragic Jewish factory manager convicted on slim evidence of murdering a 
teenage factory worker, Mary Phagan.137  On May, 20, 1915, while 
practicing law in Athens as partner in the four-lawyer firm of Cobb, Erwin 
& Rucker, Judge Cobb forwarded a letter addressed to the Chairman of the 
Prison Commission in reference to the Leo Frank case.138  Judge Cobb 
knew the man who represented Leo Frank before the Commission,139 
former Georgia congressman William Marcellus (W.M.) Howard.  Thanks 
to the efforts of Judge Cobb and thousands of others like him in and outside 
of Georgia, Frank’s sentence was commuted to life in prison.140  Sadly, a 
mob enraged by the commutation kidnapped Frank from jail and lynched 
him in the Georgia county bearing the name of Judge Cobb’s confederate 
ancestors, Cobb County.141 
Judge Cobb must have been greatly affected by the Frank lynching.  For 
many years Cobb would serve as President of the Georgia Historical 
Society, to which he delivered a memorable lecture praising the procedural 
and structural innovations of the constitution of the Confederacy.142  In 
1927, Cobb presented a surprising lecture to the Society, lambasting 
Georgia for turning a blind eye to lynching.143  By failing to hold anyone 
accountable by prosecuting lawless murderers, the state thereby failed to 
recognize a “right to live” on the part of victims.144  (Although the Georgia 
State Board of Pardons and Paroles pardoned Leo Frank on May 11, 1986, 
 
 137. See generally STEVE ONEY, AND THE DEAD SHALL RISE:  THE MURDER OF MARY 
PHAGAN AND THE LYNCHING OF LEO FRANK (2003). 
 138. Letter from Andrew J. Cobb, Partner, Cobb, Erwin & Rucker, to G. H. Yancey, Ga. 
Prison Comm’n Sec’y (May 20, 1915), available at http://cdm.sos.state.ga.us:2011/
cdm/singleitem/collection/frankclem/id/73.  It is likely that such a letter would have enclosed 
support for Frank’s clemency petition, as a large number of prominent Georgians weighed in 
support of commutation to life of Frank’s death sentence. 
 139. See Leo Frank Clemency File, GA. SECRETARY ST., http://sos.georgia.gov/archives/
what_do_we_have/online_records/leo_frank/default.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2012); see 
also Emory University Leo Frank Collection, EMORY LIB., http://findingaids.library.
emory.edu/documents/frank674/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2012) (“Representing Leo Frank were 
William M. Howard of Augusta, [and others].”). 
 140. See Hope for Frank in Final Fight, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1915, at 14. 
 141. See ONEY, supra note 137, at 561–65. 
 142. See generally Andrew J. Cobb, The Constitution of the Confederate States:  Its 
Influence on the Union It Sought To Dissolve, 5 GA. HIST. Q. 7 (1921). 
 143. Andrew J. Cobb, The Right To Live:  Will the State Protect It or Must We Rely Upon 
Federal Authority?, 6 GA. HIST. Q. 189, 192–93 (1922). 
 144. Id. at 194–95.  This article does not provide evidence, though, that Cobb opposed 
race-based segregation.  Some southerners of his day believed blacks were decidedly inferior 
and required the care and protection of whites, noblesse oblige. See John K. Larkins, Jr., 
Judge Fite’s Contempt:  Race and the Rule of Law in Early Twentieth Century Georgia, 90 
GA. HIST. Q. 62, 63 (2006). 
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his killers—prominent men who acted in broad daylight without 
disguises—were never prosecuted.)145 
Positivism and realism were coexisting jurisprudential philosophies in 
Cobb’s day, and it was not unusual to presume rights not embraced or 
incorporated.  Cobb clearly believed in higher moral rights transcending 
law and social practice.146  He wrote of a “right to live” and a “right to 
privacy” belonging to all men, whether recognized and respected or not.  
Indeed, Cobb’s defense of Leo Frank was consistent with the view he 
expressed in Pavesich that  
[t]he valuable influence upon society and upon the welfare of the public 
of the conservatism of the lawyer . . . [should] not be overestimated; but 
this conservatism should not go to the extent of refusing to recognize a 
right which the instincts of nature prove to exist, and which nothing in 
judicial decision, legal history, or writings upon the law can be called to 
demonstrate its nonexistence as a legal right.147 
Judge Cobb was born before the Civil War and lived through it.  As a 
learned jurist, he was surely aware that natural law arguments might be 
adduced as readily in a twisted defense of slavery148 as in a noble defense 
of a “right to live” and “right to privacy”.149  In 1851, a Georgia court 
argued in Neal v. Farmer,150 that slavery, though “contrary to the laws of 
nature,” according to which each man owns himself and the fruits of his 
labor, is not prohibited, but sanctioned by the Law of Nations and ordained 
by Christianity, which requires that masters treat slaves with kindness, 
noblesse oblige.151  Cobb’s claiming a “right to live” on behalf of Jewish 
 
 145. Donald Bertrand, Group Marks Date Ga. Mob Lynched Jew, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, 
Aug. 25, 2002, http://articles.nydailynews.com/2002-08-25/local/18201568_1_semitism-
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 146. See Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., The Western Judicial Circuit Today and in Bygone Times:  
A Short History of Local Superior Court Judges—Part Two, 25 POPULAR MEDIA 6 (2011), 
available at http://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/fac_pm/92 (“It has been accurately said that 
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 147. Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 78 (Ga. 1905). 
 148. Christopher L.M. Eisgruber, Justice Story, Slavery, and the Natural Law 
Foundations of American Constitutionalism, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 273, 301 n.83, 319 (1988). 
 149. Anita L. Allen & Thaddeus Pope, Social Contract Theory, Slavery, and the 
Antebellum Courts, in A COMPANION TO AFRICAN-AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY 125 (Tommy L. 
Lott & John P. Pittmann eds., 2002). 
 150. 9 Ga. 555 (1851). 
 151. Id. at 568 (holding that plaintiff slave owner may recover the value of a slave killed 
by defendant white man, where no criminal proceeding had been brought or won, since slave 
killing is not established in Georgia as a crime); see also id. at 568–69 (“Whilst it seems to 
be conceded by Jurists of all civilized countries, that the slave trade is contrary to the laws of 
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and black victims of lynching appropriated natural law for humane and just 
purposes. 
Cobb’s idea that deprivations of privacy are like slavery is at once both 
offensive and appealing.  From one point of view the analogy to slavery is 
hyperbolic152 and highly offensive:  enslaved Georgia blacks suffered 
complete bondage and degradation.  The white man whose life of 
comfortable abundance is hampered only by an unauthorized advertisement 
in a mainstream city newspaper is hardly like the man, woman, or child 
whose cruel lot is to be property bought and sold, maimed and raped at will 
under the harsh terms of social and legal inferiority that characterized 
Georgia’s version of chattel slavery.153  Moreover, Cobb does not insist that 
slavery is per se unethical or immoral, merely that invasions of privacy 
wrongly enslave. 
From the opposite point of view, the slavery analogy is appealing:  
Privacy is such an important thing—a foundational good—that the analogy 
is appropriately powerful rhetoric.  It forces one to sit up and pay attention.  
Privacy invasions are not petty assaults on inessential aspects of honor or 
dignity.154  They are serious, potentially ruinous interferences with the 
foundational goods that are cornerstones of freedom. 
The normative case for the right to privacy is that privacy is something 
persons want and need, and it is something that a just society would not 
deny them.  One does not have to be a proponent of natural law to embrace 
 
nature, upon the principle, that every man has a natural right to the fruits of his own labor, 
and therefore, no other person can rightfully deprive him of them, and appropriate them 
against his will; yet, it is also well settled, that it is not prohibited by the Laws of Nations.  
This principle of the Law of Nations originated in the rights which war was originally held to 
confer.  One of these rights was, that the victor might enslave the vanquished.”); id. at 582 
(“The negro and his master are but fulfilling a divine appointment. Christ came not to 
remove the curse; but recognizing the relation of master and servant, he prescribed the rules 
which govern, and the obligations which grow out of it, and thus ordained it an institution of 
christianity. . . .  The laws of Georgia, at this moment, recognize the negro as a man, whilst 
they hold him property—whilst they enforce obedience in the slave, they require justice and 
moderation in the master. . . .  [T]he relation of master and slave in Georgia, is an institution 
subject to the law of kindness to as great an extent as any institution springing out of the 
relation of employer and employed, any where existing amongst men.”). 
 152. Cf. Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Is Nominal Use an Answer to the Free Speech and Right 
of Publicity Quandary?:  Lessons From America’s National Pastime, 11 CHAP. L. REV. 435, 
440 (2008) (“Even if one agrees with Pavesich that unauthorized uses of one’s likeness in 
advertising is akin to slavery, that does not mean that the use of the players’ photographs on 
baseball cards is the same.” (footnote omitted)). 
 153. Kahn, supra note 101, at 760 (“Plessy and Pavesich, then, can be viewed as unlikely 
twins, each dealing with new conceptions of slavery and subordination as the United States 
entered the modern age.  The former denied control over personal identity to blacks, while 
the latter established it for whites.”). 
 154. Concerns about honor and dignity are not inherently petty, far from it.  Care must be 
taken not to overemphasize the distinction between liberty-based and dignity-based 
philosophical rationales for privacy, since dignitarian concerns often undergird deontological 
arguments for social and political liberty, as they do in Kantian ethical theory. Cf. James Q. 
Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy:  Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 
1151 (2004) (arguing that liberty is a more distinct strand in U.S. than in European privacy 
law, where concerns about honor and dignity pervade). 
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the proposition that privacy protection is an imperative, and something that 
a just society would not neglect.  Interferences with privacy, such as putting 
a man’s photo into commercial service, are deprivations of the freedom to 
enjoy a life of reserve outside the public gaze.155  One could object to 
nonconsensual photograph use as a violation of a property interest in 
controlling assets.  But what Judge Cobb sought to push is a quite different 
idea that use of a man or woman’s photo interferes with their freedom to 
limit the public gaze—a liberty so basic that without it one is, to that extent, 
a slave. 
VI.  FOUNDATIONAL GOODS AND THE CASE FOR PRIVACY RIGHTS 
Judge Cobb’s defense of the right to privacy commences with the social 
contractarian natural law and ends with an analogy of invasions of privacy 
to slavery.  There is sufficient positive law argument in Cobb’s opinion to 
quiet worries of pure, excessive judicial invention.  But why apologize for 
the natural law argument?  Even assuming that the epistemology of natural 
law, whereby humans have access to binding rules of human conduct, must 
be set aside, Cobb’s characterization of the right to privacy as demanded by 
natural law meshes well with the extant normative perspectives according to 
which many forms of informational and physical privacies are, what I call 
in a recent book, “foundational goods”156—just demands of government 
and social order, the world over.  We often want and need our privacy; and 
it is often inhumane and unjust to deny us our “liberty of privacy.”  Cobb’s 
strong language of natural right and the analogy to slavery mesh well, too, 
with the role that the right to privacy came to play in post–World War II 
foundational human rights documents, multinational European charters, and 
European Union law.157  Article 12 of the United Nations Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights, provides that:  “No one shall be subjected to 
arbitrary interference with his privacy . . . .”158  The United Nations has 
subsequently issued its Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerized 
Personal Data Files, which reflects high regard for the kinds of privacy at 
risk in the digital age.159  Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights states that:  “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or 
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 156. ALLEN, supra note 39, at xii, 171. 
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unlawful interference with his privacy . . . .  [and] [e]veryone has the right 
to the protection of the law against such interference.”160 
Scholars in the English-speaking world first began to analyze privacy as 
a normative concept in earnest in the 1960s and 1970s.161  Philosophers and 
other theorists rightly linked the experience of personal privacy with 
dignity, autonomy, civility, and intimacy; they also linked it to repose, self-
expression, creativity, and reflection; they have tied privacy to the 
preservation of unique preferences and distinct traditions.162  Major ethical 
traditions—utilitarian, Kantian, and Aristotelian—provide grounds for 
taking privacy very seriously.  From a utilitarian perspective, privacy has 
value as a tool for enhancing long-term freedom and opportunity by, for 
example, giving us information advantages over others.  But privacy has 
dignitarian and aretaic ethical value as well.  Respect for privacy, our own 
and others’, is a requirement of respecting persons as ends in themselves.  
Reserve and modesty are ethical virtues and positive character traits.  Major 
religious traditions, including Christianity, Islam, and Judaism, argue for 
certain informational and physical privacies.163 
I am aligned with moral, legal, and political theorists who have argued 
that privacy is a right, and with the smaller group of theorists who have 
made a point of arguing that privacy is often a duty to oneself and to others, 
as well as a right.164  Our duty of privacy to ourselves asks that we take into 
account the way in which our own characters, personalities, and life 
enterprises could be adversely affected by decisions to flaunt, expose, and 
share rather than to reserve, conceal, and keep. 
I urge that we think of privacy as a “foundational” good like freedom and 
equality.  Indeed, as Judge Cobb argued we require a “liberty of privacy” to 
have lives of our own, rich with other goods.  Many forms of physical and 
informational privacy are the kinds of goods that are presupposed by a great 
many other goods.  For example, if one wants to enjoy the good referred to 
as “reputation,” then anonymity, confidentiality, secrecy, and data 
protection are prerequisites.  If one wants to be a scholar or an artist, then 
opportunities for solitude may be a prerequisite.  Seclusion is a prerequisite 
of forms of intimate relationships (sexual, familial) that thrive on 
unembarrassed self-revelation and free expression.  Characterizing privacy 
as a foundational good, I further maintain that a just and good society 
 
 160. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted and open for signature 
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
 161. See generally Anita L. Allen, Privacy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PRACTICAL 
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 162. See ALLEN, supra note 39, at 171. 
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governed by the rule of law would include legal protections for 
foundational privacies.  The positive rights to privacy we enjoy are 
compelling rights because they link to vitally important ends and means.  
This perspective is consistent with both the notion that privacy rights are 
not absolute and commonly must give way to the demands of security, law 
enforcement, or public health, and with the perspective that individuals 
often prefer association and disclosure to privacy. 
Judge Cobb exalted the right to privacy as a natural right, and influenced 
others to do it, during his lifetime and beyond it.165  Again, one does not 
have to be a proponent of natural law to embrace the proposition that the 
right to privacy is something persons want and need, and something that a 
just society would not deny them.  Interferences with privacy, such as 
putting a man’s photograph into commercial service, are deprivations both 
of control over reputation and of the freedom to enjoy a life of reserve 
outside the public gaze. 
A part of the genius of Judge Cobb’s opinion is that through the strong 
language of natural law and slavery, he reiterated the important role 
implicitly given to privacy and private life conferred by the U.S. 
Constitution and state constitutions with similar provisions.166  As I have 
argued elsewhere, the word privacy does not appear in the U.S. 
Constitution, of course, but “rich conceptions of privacy are implicit in any 
plausible renderings of the [Bill of Rights].”167  Protections of religion, 
 
 165. See, e.g., State v. Mosch, 519 A.2d 937, 942 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) (“The 
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constitutional law); Doe v. Doe, 314 N.E.2d 128, 137 (Mass. 1974) (Reardon, J., dissenting) 
(“The ‘right of privacy’ cases discussed above have as an implicit assumption that as matter 
of practical universal agreement and natural right there exists a critical interest in individual 
control of certain aspects of human lives.  The explicitly defined prohibition of State 
interference with these rights evinces an implicit recognition that to some degree these 
interests are protectible against private persons as well.  Thus there is a cognizable private 
interest in begetting and raising children and, indeed, in the termination of a pregnancy.  It is, 
I submit, equally true that such an interest exists in the father with respect to the completion 
in birth of an existing pregnancy.”); State v. Howe, 308 N.W.2d 743, 749 (N.D. 1981) 
(Pederson, J., specially concurring) (“Free men and women can be injured by unwarranted 
invasion of privacy—whether we should call it a natural right or constitutional in scope has 
not been settled in the minds of judicial scholars.” (citing City of Grand Forks v. Grand 
Forks Herald, Inc., 307 N.W.2d 572 (N.D. 1981))). 
 166. James Saylor, Note, Computers As Castles:  Preventing the Plain View Doctrine 
from Becoming a Vehicle for Overbroad Digital Searches, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2809, 2815 
(2011) (“The notion of a natural right to privacy and freedom against arbitrary governmental 
intrusion predated the strong reactions against general warrants and writs of assistance that 
immediately precipitated the American Revolution.”). 
 167. Anita L. Allen, First Amendment Privacy and the Battle for Progressively Liberal 
Social Change, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 885, 887 (2012). 
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thought and intellect, homes, and papers, combined with the reservation of 
unremunerated rights comprise strong constitutional privacy protections.  
About ten U.S. states’ constitutions today protect privacy explicitly as a 
consequence of legislative action168 and several other states’ courts have 
established constitutional privacy.169  Privacy protection is core to the 
European Union’s constitutional self-understanding as well.  Article 7 of 
the E.U. Charter of Fundamental Rights calls for respect for “private and 
family life, home and communications,” and Article 8 calls for the 
Protection of Personal Data.170 
About a dozen major U.S. statutes protect government, medical, genetic, 
educational, financial, telephonic, and children’s privacy for a reason.171  
We arguably need additional and revised statutory protection in the United 
States.  Indeed, in March 2012, the Federal Trade Commission issued a 
report calling upon Congress to enact additional “baseline privacy 
legislation” to protect internet users from unwanted browser tracking and 
other privacy problems.172  Recent legislation proposed by members of 
Congress seeks to address the demands of privacy protection in the world 
dominated by extensive use of the internet for commerce and 
communication, cellular telephone communications, and social 
networking.173 
 
 168. For a convenient list, see Privacy Protections in State Constitutions, NAT’L CONF. 
ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/privacy-protections-in-state-
constitutions.aspx (last visited Nov. 16, 2012). 
 169. See Jeffrey Shaman, The Right of Privacy in State Constitutional Law, 37 RUTGERS 
L.J. 971, 974 (2006) (describing the mechanism through which states contemplate privacy as 
a constitutional principle). 
 170. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union Art. 7, Dec. 7, 2000, 2000 
O.J. (C 364) 10. 
 171. See Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006) (federal record privacy law); 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 
1338 (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.) (financial privacy law); Fair Credit 
Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006) (credit and financial information privacy law); 
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 6501 (children’s online 
privacy law); Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2006) 
(telephone, computer, and other device communication privacy law); Video Privacy 
Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2006) (video rental record privacy law); Family 
Education and Right to Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2006) (education record 
privacy law); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
191, § 701(1)–(3), 110 Stat. 1936, 1939–40 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 
and 42 U.S.C.) (health information privacy and data security law); Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (codified in scattered 
sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C) (genetic privacy law). 
 172. FTC, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE:  
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS (2012), available at http://www.
ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326privacyreport.pdf. 
 173. See, e.g., Mobile Device Privacy Act, H.R. 6377, 112th Cong. (2012); Issues & 
Legislation, CONGRESSMAN ED MARKIE, http://markey.house.gov/issues, (last visited Nov. 
16, 2012) (“Rep. Markey is the co-chair of the Congressional Privacy Caucus (CPC), which 
aims to educate members of Congress and staff on matters of privacy.”); see also Editorial, 
The End of Privacy?, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2012, at SR10. 
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Like the United States, the European Union has seen growth and 
expansion of privacy law in the past few decades and is currently debating 
directions for appropriate reforms to catch up with new technologies and 
the cultural changes technologies have effectuated.  The European Union’s 
historic privacy directives174 governing member states’ legal requirements 
are expected to undergo major change to defragment E.U. law and keep 
apace of changes in technology and social practice.175  An anticipated new 
“General Data Protection Regulation” will be directly applicable in all 
member states of the European Union replacing the individual conforming 
national data protection laws currently in force in the different member 
states.176  It is commonly understood that the current E.U. privacy 
 
 174. I am referring principally to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31; 
Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 
Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic 
Communications Sector, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37; Directive 2006/24/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the Retention of Data Generated or 
Processed in Connection with the Provision of Publicly Available Electronic 
Communications Services or of Public Communications Networks and Amending Directive 
2002/58/EC, 2006 O.J. (L 105) 54; Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 25 November 2009 Amending Directive 2002/22/EC, 2009 O.J. (L 337) 
11. 
 175. See Protection of Personal Data, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/index_en.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2012). 
 176. One commentator suggested that the revisions to the new law “break[] [the] link 
with ‘privacy’ and [h]uman [r]ights.” See EU Data Protection Regulation Breaks Explicit 
Link with “Privacy” and Human Rights, AMBERHAWK (Feb. 2, 2012), http://amberhawk.
typepad.com/amberhawk/2012/02/eu-data-protection-regulation-breaks-explicit-link-with-
privacy-and-human-rights.html.  But the Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General Data 
Protection Regulation), COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012), tells a different story: 
In its Communication on “A comprehensive approach on personal data protection 
in the European Union”, the Commission concluded that the EU needs a more 
comprehensive and coherent policy on the fundamental right to personal data 
protection. 
  The current framework remains sound as far as its objectives and principles are 
concerned, but it is has not prevented fragmentation . . . .  This is why it is time to 
build a stronger and more coherent data protection framework in the EU . . . . 
. . . . 
The right to protection of personal data is established by Article 8 of the Charter 
and Article 16 TFEU and in Article 8 of the ECHR. As underlined by the Court of 
Justice of the EU, the right to the protection of personal data is not an absolute 
right, but must be considered in relation to its function in society. Data protection 
is closely linked to respect for private and family life protected by Article 7 of the 
Charter.  This is reflected by Article 1(1) of Directive 95/46/EC which provides 
that Member States shall protect fundamental rights and freedoms of natural 
persons and in particular their right to privacy with respect of the processing of 
personal data. 
  Other potentially affected fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter are the 
following:  freedom of expression (Article 11 of the Charter); freedom to conduct 
a business (Article 16); the right to property and in particular the protection of 
intellectual property (Article 17(2)); the prohibition of any discrimination amongst 
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directives represent an understanding of the requirements of human 
rights.177  There have been some rumblings that the proposed new general 
privacy rules for the European Union abandon the word “privacy” and the 
deep human rights commitments.  It is true that proposed regulations speak 
of “data protection.”178  But I see no evidence that the European Union has 
forgotten that privacy is among the key rationales for data protection:  the 
preface to the proposed rule states plainly that the “objectives and 
principles” of the current framework remain sound.179 
CONCLUSION 
My conclusion is simple.  The natural law discourse of Pavesich does not 
render the opinion archaic.  Far from it, the spirit of natural law reasoning 
and a robust regard for liberty promoted by the case resonate even in the 
technology-saturated age of social networking and revelation.180  The 
slavery discourse of Pavesich enhances the opinion’s natural law discourse 
by underscoring the vital, foundational role that privacy protection plays in 
our lives.  It may have taken a son, nephew, and grandson of slaveholders 
like Judge Cobb to so starkly and persuasively frame the significance of 
having lives of our own, featuring realms beyond the gaze and control of 
others. 
  
 
others on grounds such as race, ethnic origin, genetic features, religion or belief, 
political opinion or any other opinion, disability or sexual orientation (Article 21); 
the rights of the child (Article 24); the right to a high level of human health care 
(Article 35); the right of access to documents (Article 42); the right to an effective 
remedy and a fair trial (Article 47).  
Id. at 2, 6–7. 
 177. See Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 174, ¶ 10. 
 178. See Proposal for a Regulation, supra note 176. 
 179. Id. at 18, ¶ 7. 
 180. Cf. Barbara J. Evans, Much Ado About Data Ownership, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 69, 
127 (2011) (“Claeys has argued rather persuasively that the old natural rights analysis did a 
better job of drawing sensible lines than modern utilitarian balancing can do.”). 
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